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Republican Impartiality

This article will advocate the political search for truth and justice, which I shall call
'republicanism', and a technique for finding them, which I shall call 'representative

democracy'. 'Republicanism' is the belief that truth and justice exist and should
guide the actions both of individuals and of the state.' 'Representative democracy'
is the system in which the citizens select representatives to determine what the laws

should be, and to apply them.2 Republican impartiality provides the standpoint
from which different moral intuitions or conceptions of the common good should
be evaluated in a just state.

I. Republicanism
The argument for republicanism is very simple. We may assume that truth and
justice ('the common good') exist, and should be sought, because if they do not it
cannot be false or unjust to seek them. Similarly, we may assume that some choices
of action are better than others, because if no choices are right, then making the
(seemingly) best choices cannot be wrong. Unless one assumes that there is at least

one right thing to do, neither states nor individuals can have a moral basis for
action. If there are right choices to be made, then both individuals and their
governments should try to make and act on them.3
Would-be republicans will need a technique for finding the truth, however, and
for making right choices. People often have very different ideas of what truth and
justice are. Long deliberations fail to produce consensus. This creates at least three

related difficulties. First, when I believe that I know what is right, but others
disagree, I will need a way to persuade them to let me do the right thing. Second,
even if I think that I am right, I will need a way to confirm my belief, particularly
when others disagree with me. I may think that I am right, but be wrong. Finally,
' Cf Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man (1792) in The Writings of Thomas Paine, M. D. Conway (ed) (New York:
AMS Press, 1967): Vol 2, 421-2. 'What is called a republic is not any particular form of government. It is wholly

characteristical of the purport, matter of object for which government ought to be instituted, and on which it is to be

employed, RES-PUBLICA, the public affairs, or the public good ... Every government that does not act on the
principle of a Republic, or in other words, that does not make the res-publica its whole or sole object, is not good
government ... [Republican government] is not necessarily connected with any particular form but it most naturally
associates with the representative form, as being best calculated to secure the end for which a nation is at the expense of
supporting it.'

2 Cf Publius (James Madison), Federalist No 10, in The Federalist, Clinton Rossiter (ed) (New York: New American
Library, 1961) 81-2: 'A republic ... [is] a government in which a scheme of representation takes place', so that 'the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant with the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves ...'
3 Cf ibid (Federalist No 51) 324: 'Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and
ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.'

? Oxford University Press 1991 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 11, No. 2

274 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies VOL. 11

there may be situations in which doing the right thing requir
others. I will need a way to make others do the right thing to
systems for helping everyone to find and do the right thing

II. Democracy
My argument will be that representative democracies are the

This means that I consider representative democracy the b

getting others to accept the truth; (2) finding the truth ones
whatever co-operation may be necessary to take right action.

ism remains morally prior to democracy, in that represent

justified only because they are republics. To discredit democra

republicanism.
Despite much recent interest in establishing a 'shared p

justification of political and social institutions' or an 'imperson

which to make] the distinction between my believing som
true',4 there has been surprisingly little discussion of dem
technique. The most prominent recent advocates of the im
cation of political decisions, John Rawls and Thomas Nag

suggested methods on 'certain fundamental intuitive ideas view

public political culture of a democratic society' (Rawls)5 an

which both parties share, but from which they get different
cannot, being limited creatures, be expected to exercise it per
neither Rawls nor Nagel advocates democracy itself as a techn
truth. Rawls thinks that people will not agree on the truth an
search for truth is counterproductive.7 Nagel accepts the dem
way of reasoning from shared premises, but not for resolving
the premises themselves.8 Such limitations on the search for tr
of modern liberalism.

III. Liberalism
Many democrats have called themselves 'liberals', but the two concepts are
separable, and should be separated. Just as republicanism is morally prior to
democracy, so democracy is morally prior to liberalism. To discredit liberalism is

not to discredit democracy. Whatever value liberalism has must 15e tested and
confirmed by (republican) democratic processes. Thus I need not and will not
either embrace or fully define 'liberalism' to make my argument for democracy,

John Rawls, 'The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus' in (1987) 7 OJLS 1 and Thomas Nagel, 'Moral Conflict and
Political Legitimacy' in (1987) 16 Philosophy & Public Affairs 231.
'The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus', 6.
6 'Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy', 234.
7 John Rawls, 'Justice and Fairness: Political not Metaphysical', (1985) 14 Philosophy & Public Affairs 230.
8 'Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy', 233.
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but I will address the primary assumption behind liberal
democratic republicanism.9
The primary assumption behind liberal misgivings about dem
ism is what has been called 'the fact of pluralism'.'1 Pluralists
conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the meani
of human life ('conceptions of the good'), which cannot be

never diminish."I Given the fact of pluralism, persuading other

consider to be the right thing may prove very difficult. Libe
convince others not to interfere with our projects by promising
theirs. We should act collectively only on the basis of those tr
can all agree.12

I will call this the 'liberal' solution to the first diffi

government: when I believe that I know what is right, but ot

expect them to let me do the right thing only if I also le

consider to be the right thing. Some liberals make the furthe
substantively wrong to expect people to do what is right u
premises show it to be right for them.

IV. Pluralism
This raises the second difficulty of republican government which I shall call the
problem of decent humility: how can I be sure that my own perception of the truth
is true? Techniques of impartiality which presuppose 'the fact of pluralism' imply
that we all consider ourselves infallible, and cannot (or should not) be expected to

subscribe to a common truth unless we can perceive it ourselves. This requires
constructing a sharp distinction between reason and moral intuition. For pluralists
'reason' is the process by which we reach conclusions by deduction from intuited

first principles.3 Pluralist moral intuition (on the other hand) is mysterious and

9 Liberals who reject my arguments for democracy as the best republican technique for finding and acting upon the

truth may still wish to argue that republicanism requires liberalism. They will need to offer some non-democratic
method for (1) getting others to accept this as true; (2) confirming their own intuitions about the matter; and (3)
arranging whatever co-operative action may be necessary to realize liberalism. I have offered democracy as the best
republican technique, which is why I say that 'democracy is morally prior to liberalism'. At this stage in my argument
it is democracy, not liberalism, that I am interested in. Democratic deliberation may well confirm that liberal ideals are
constitutive of the true principles of justice. This article does not get that far.

10 Eg John Rawls, 'The Domain of The Political and Overlapping Consensus', (1989) 64 N Y Univ L Rev 234.
1t 'The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus', 4. Let me add some observations about the words 'good' and 'justice'
because I think misunderstanding these words may undermine my arguments for democracy. Note that different
things may be recognized to be good for different people, but there can be only one established justice. Thus it is
misleading to imply, as John Rawls does, that people's 'conceptions of the good' embrace both moral viewpoints and
personal views of 'rational advantage'. I think it is safe to assume that a just moral order will encourage people to
pursue many different private ends, occupations and activities. Trying to realize moral truth in society does not
preclude individuals from pursuing many different conceptions of the good life. The republic will not interfere with
even wicked or misguided ends unless it is just to do so.
12 John Rawls adds that even when all agree we should avoid the claim of truth as divisive. Ibid, 14-15; 'Justice as
Fairness', 230. Thomas Nagel allows true reason to overrule faulty deductions from shared moral instincts, but not
controversial moral premises. 'Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy', 233.
13 Eg John Rawls, A Theory of ustice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) 142-3; 'Justice as Fairness',
229. Cf David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, Book II, Part III, s 3 in L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed) Hume's Treatise
continued on page 276
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irrational:14 each individual makes his or her own moral as

must take as given in constructing systems of social co-operat
If people's incommensurable moral intuitions were equally va

then it might follow that no republican technique (includ

legitimately choose between them. But assume (as we have) tha

follows that some moral perceptions are preferable to oth
found and followed. Sometimes choices must be made betw
perceptions. Decent humility requires that we defer to a r

resolving conflicting perceptions of moral truth, even when w

the results. People should and will recognize that they may

value of public deliberation about ultimate truths is that it he

own moral mistakes-but a good republican technique goes f

to defer when we ought to, without admitting mistakes, if w

Democracy may yield truths that I do not approve, but it

method for correcting democratic mistakes, while testing my

Thus pluralists are wrong to assume that erroneous m
intractable. People who accept that truth exists, and wish to do

notice inevitable variations in people's perceptions of the tr

not to defiance, but to debate. By reasoning with each other w
other's understanding. 'Reasoning' in this context is not deduc
intuited principles, but rather a constructive exchange of mor
'reasoning' includes co-operation in the intuition or perception
Sometimes deeper premises will be found to stand behind wha

be first principles, sometimes conclusions will be found

supposed premises, or to be premises themselves. The point is
interested in finding truth will recognize that their own perc
are not always accurate, and be willing to co-operate to improv

V. Self-evident Truths

The search for moral truth is like the search for any other so

must ultimately rest on unprovable perceptions, which I s
truths'. Mathematical or geometrical 'facts' and 'proofs' de

principles as much as moral truths do. It must be taken as self
is not a triangle, that three exceeds two, and so forth.'6 By se
continued from page 275

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888) 415: 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the p
to any other office but to serve and obey them'.

4 Nagel, 'Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy', 232-3. Cf Hume, Treatise, Book II
passion is neither founded on false suppositions [about material objects], nor chooses m
the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to reason to pref
world to the scratching of my finger ... In short, a passion must be accompany'd with som

its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, wh
judgment.'
"s This liberal viewpoint implies that there is nothing to morality but expressions of will. It may entail profoundly

illiberal results. Eg Friedrich Nietzsche, Die froehliche Wissenschaft, s 335 (1886) in Gesammeite Werke, Vol XII
(Munich: Musarion, 1924) 243-7.
16 The examples are from John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700), Book IV, Chapter I,
Section I, P. H. Nidditch (ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 531.
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mean obvious. Some moral perceptions may be difficult, a
training or education. Thus moral knowledge, like mathe
knowledge, will advance as people perceive, substantiate an
about better conceptions of the truth.'7
The fact that some true propositions must be perceived for

should not deter those who seek moral truth any more t

mathematicians, biologists, or seekers after truth in any othe

Modern liberals like Rawls and Nagel hesitate to sanction
'moral instincts' (Nagel) or 'conception of the good' (Raw

think that to overrule someone's fundamental perceptions is p
Representative democracy gives liberals a technique for testin

and persuading others. Citizen deliberation in a representat

(or might not) identify as moral truth the proposition that n

should be overruled, or that no one should be compelled

conception of the good. One advantage democracy has

republican technique is that it can justify liberalism to non-li

valuable).

VI. Representative Democracy
The argument for democratic republicanism requires only three assumptions: (1)
that truth exists about what people ought to do; (2) that people want to do the right

thing; and (3) that everyone is capable of perceiving moral truths. My first
assumption justified republicanism. My second assumption overcame the challenge
of pluralism. My third will establish the value of representative democracy. Let me
review the argument so far: First, when there is a right thing to do, people should
do it willingly.21 Second, people often do not agree on what the right thing to do is.

Even if I think I know what the right thing is, I may be wrong, particularly if
others disagree with me. Finally, the right thing may be expressed in several
ways--either as a simple perceived truth or as a proven truth, derived from true
premises. People may know the truth without understanding its premises, or know
true premises without perceiving all the truths that derive from them. Different
people may perceive different aspects of the truth.
Notice that all these points assume that human beings are capable of perceiving
moral truths. People can only do the right thing willingly if they understand what
the right thing to do is. The disagreement of others will only shake my convictions
17 Cf Burlamaqui, Principles of Natural Law, Part II, Ch V, s I, as cited and explained by Morton White, The

Philosophy of The American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978) 36-41.
Is Truth may be easier to perceive in those sciences which require the fewest first principles.
19 Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', 233-4; Nagel, 'Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy', 233.

20 Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness', 245; 'The Idea of An Overlapping Consensus', 4-5; Nagel, 'Moral Conflict and
Political Legitimacy', 238.
21 I have not assumed, although I think it is true, that we all have a duty to educate each other about the moral

truth. Even if we have no obligation to assist in each other's moral education, implementing a correct view of the truth

will be easier if as many people as possible can be made to understand what truth is, and embrace it. The democratic
technique of republicanism gives everyone an incentive to educate others, because in the end the majority view will
prevail, and those who think they are right will wish to convince the rest.
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if I think their perceptions have some validity. The pro

different modes of perception or levels of abstraction is only
the capability of perceiving the truth. Indeed, the whole insti

of making moral arguments, and of publishing articles

presumes that other people are capable of perceiving truths,
of them will do so.

Two things follow if everyone is capable of perceiving the tr
it. First, we should share our perceptions with others; and se

make use of each other's perceptions. Representative de

incentive for the first and a technique for the second. We w
perceptions of truth with others, because our perceptions wi
we can convince the majority to adopt them. The technique f

perceptions in a democracy is to participate in the public
actions by the democratic result.

The more people I can convince that I am right, the mo
about the truth of my own opinions. Truths will event
recognition, once they are expressed.

Total consensus may be difficult to achieve, but democr
unanimity. All that is necessary is deference to the dem

unconvinced will not be forced to agree with the majority, p
democratic decisions until they can convince their fellow cit
themselves change their minds. Some who strongly disagree
democratic majority may justifiably coerce or ignore them,
either seems appropriate.22

Pluralist misgivings about violating each other's 'concep
'moral intuitions' reflect a confusion about the nature of

Truth is too complicated for any individual to have a compre

the good'. Rather we have limited, incomplete percep

perceptions are not permanent. They represent our best effo

the truth. Sometimes we can be made to see the deeper t
reflect, or other truths that our perceptions entail. Most
that they do not have a complete grasp of moral truth, an
technique for getting a better one. Those offered democracy
to embrace it.

VII. Representation
So far I have not been very specific about the structure of 'representative
democracy', or why I use the qualifying adjective 'representative'. Practical
considerations make the qualification necessary. Simple democracy would require
22 1 do not mean by this to imply that coercion is desirable, that democratic republicanism will ever endorse
coercion as a right course of action, or that citizens will always have an obligation to obey democratic majorities, but
rather that the best way to determine whether coercion is (ever) appropriate is through the republican deliberation of a
representative democracy.
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all citizens to participate in deliberating and deciding up
would be impractical. Too many decisions need to be m

everyone to be involved in all of them. Thus some decision
individuals in a certain position, as when a policeman sees a

decides to intervene. Representative democracy justifie

necessary decision-makers. If a democratic process c
society's executives, executives will be constrained by

deliberation discovers.

Societies are too complicated for more than a very few ex
directly. For example, it would not be practical for citizen

performance of every policeman-but the people may
chooses a police chief, who chooses policemen. Several s

necessary between the people and their agents. This is why
officials, democracies also require elected representatives to
agents should do in the performance of their duties.

I do not think it would be appropriate at this point to

scheme of representation. When I say that people will defe
help them to find and act upon the truth, and advocate rep
the technique for doing so, I recognize that what is availab
depend to a great extent on local circumstances. The ideal s
would be determined by the widest possible democratic con

history has created democracies by other means as

recommend a particular representative structure, only to o
to be one, and that I would expect people to defer to it.

VIII. Republican Democracy

My three assumptions, (1) that there is truth about justice,

do the right thing and (3) that people can perceive th
conclusion that democracies will be the most effective
siderations dictate that any workable democracy will
representation. I would like to suggest that there are als
preferring representative to direct democracies.

The value of the democratic technique is the access it

perceptions of the truth through the process of deliberatio

technique is valuable only to the extent that it is emplo
truth, and (2) through deliberation. This reflects the
democracy. Big groups can't deliberate because so few ca

democratic arrangements promote truth-seeking deliberati

simple democracy by giving everyone a voice. Truth-see
democracy (if simple democracy were possible) would pe
scheme of representation. Democracies are inevitably re

sentation is in keeping with the purpose of democ
republican: to search for truth.
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IX. Co-operation

Let me summarize my responses to those who cannot accept m
people believe either (1) that there is no truth; (2) that many
or (3) that only they and those who agree with them can perc
answer to the first objection is that if there is no truth it does
it. The second and third objections.lead to much the same resu
in arguing with someone who disregards the truth, or cannot

you persuade me that you are right unless I have the des
understand your arguments? To have a discussion we both
other can reason. Thus as a practical matter no system ex

justify itself to the unconvinced, or expect uncoerced co-oper

disagree with its decisions, because no system except dem

reason of the citizens it overrules. Democracy solves the third
what to do when I require the co-operation of others to do suc

to be done. Convince them--or convince the unconvinced to
People will co-operate in doing what democracies determ
individuals disagree) the democratic result is the most acc
possible of what ought to be done. Consider the options: indiv
to each other's reason through a democratic process; (2) fo
threats; (3) attempt to convince others by a bald assertion of a
up the search for the truth. Only those who are extremely su
will choose the second option. The third option will seldo
option defeats the purpose of the republic. Only the dem
republicanism has a reasonable hope of effectuating uncoerced
Those who accept that other people have the capacity to perc
that our own perceptions of the truth may be faulty or in
accept that some form of representative democracy constitute
Other forms of government rest on force, or on an unr
Democracy rests on the soul-satisfying presumption that, o

co-operate in finding the truth, they will eventually find it, or
they could by any other method.

X. The Laws
The laws of a true republic constitute an impartial determination of what ought

be done in given situations. Many have seen the essence of republicanism in
fidelity to law, and identified the republic as 'an empire of laws and not men'.23

Thus it is particularly important to be clear about the role of laws in a repub
both as they relate to citizens and to the representatives the citizens select.

23 Eg John Adams, A Defence of The Constitutions of Government of The United States of America (London
1787-1788) (reprinted New York: Da Capo, 1971): Vol III, 159-60: '[Some] define a republic to signify only gover
ment, in which all men ... are equally subject to the laws. This indeed appears to be the true, and only true defini

of a republic.' Cf. Ibid, Thoughts on Government Applicable to the Present State of the American Colonies (Philadelphi

1776) in Works (ed. C. F. Adams, 1865) IV, 194; also Letter to John Penn and the Delegates of North Carolina, i
Works, IV, 204. I would like to thank Professor John Finnis for drawing my attention to these passages.
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In the first place, it may not be possible, prudent or
determination of every specific decision faced by either

There may be many situations in which the best thing a re
do is to let people decide for themselves what to do, or t
discretion to magistrates. Some decisions and rules shoul

avoid the self-interest and passions of individual cases an

should not. The only constant rule will be that republics sh

established rules and procedures, which should not exist
available methods for establishing truth and justice.

If I am right that representative democracies constitute t

it follows that democracies are justified in coercing dis

coercion is mandated by a democratic process.24 Similar

have an obligation to obey the laws of a democratic republi

not convinced by the law's rationale. But one of demo
strengths as a republican technique is that it justifies civil

circumstances. Thus although democratic republics are

suing and executing their laws, I may sometimes be justifie
feel sufficiently strongly that the republic is mistaken.25
may change people's minds, and alter the democratic result
justified in coercing me, when it thinks it is necessary, bu
defying the republic, when democracy makes mistakes.26

XI. Conclusion
Many disagreements boil down to the bare assertion of conflicting and incommensurable moral intuitions. When this happens an impartial technique will be
required to distinguish between truth and mere assertions of truth. I have
suggested that representative democracy constitutes the best form of what I have

called 'republican impartiality'. Democracy must be republican to be valid, which
is to say conducted as a search for truth. I have made three assumptions to show
that this is possible: (1) truth exists about what people ought to do; (2) everyone is
capable of perceiving moral truths; and (3) people want to do the right thing.
Those assumptions solve the three republican difficulties of (1) getting others to
accept the truth; (2) finding the truth oneself; and (3) arranging the co-operation
necessary to take right action. If we all have partial perceptions of the truth, and
24 Which is not to say that it ever will be. 'Coercion' is a form of action. When it is right to coerce others, citizens

should do so. Whether coercion is ever right must be determined through the republican deliberation of a

representative democracy. It may well be that state coercion is self-defeating as a means of securing that people lead
just lives. One value of democracy as a republican technique is that by seeking to convince people of the truth, it
minimizes possible occasions for coercion. (I would like to thank this journal's anonymous referee for drawing my
attention to the importance of this argument.)

25 For instance, a democracy might openly abandon the search for truth, and embrace the promotion of private
interest-perhaps the interests of a majority. Such a democracy would not be a republic, and citizens would have no
obligation to obey its laws.
26 For a hint at the distinction between the right to command and to enforce obedience (law's legitimate authority)
and the citizens' obligation to obey the law (which does not always follow from legitimate authority) see M. B. E.
Smith, 'Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?', (1973) 82 Yale LawJournal 976.
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want to find truth, decent humility should lead us to co-oper

the common good. Democratic deliberation values everyone
them in public debate, and indicates which are most like

republican impartiality of a representative democracy provide
from which to make a just choice between conflicting moral i
Mortimer Sellers*

* School of Law, University of Baltimore. I am grateful to John Finnis, Donald Mulcahey and the editors of the
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Support for writing this article was
provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities.

